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Beyond Common Knowledge: Empirical Approaches to the Rule 
of Law. Edited by Erik J. Jensen and Thomas C. Heller. Stanford Uni-
versity Press: Palo Alto, Cal., 2003. Pp. 456. $70.00 (cloth). 
Following in the Stanford tradition of socio-legal studies, Beyond Common 
Knowledge1 brings together an impressive array of international scholars and 
practitioners for a timely study of judicial reform and “rule-of-law assistance” 
(“ROLA”).2 Much of rule-of-law literature relies on insufªciently documented 
and often arid doctrinal approaches to the rule of law.3 In contrast, Beyond 
Common Knowledge places empiricism at the center of comparative legal scholar-
ship to understand what courts and their alternatives actually do and what is 
actually happening within ROLA.4 This collection of studies from around 
the world successfully engages both scholars and policymakers in an empiri-
cally enlightened reassessment of what ROLA actually is and of what it can 
and therefore should be.5 While Beyond Common Knowledge makes an impor-
tant contribution to the ROLA debate by introducing an empirical approach, 
the full value of an empirical inquiry will not be realized unless comple-
 
                                                                                                                      
1. Beyond Common Knowledge: Empirical Approaches to the Rule of Law (Erik J. Jensen & 
Thomas C. Heller eds., 2003). Heller is the Lewis Talbot and Nadine Hearn Shelton Professor of Interna-
tional Legal Studies and Jensen is Lecturer and Director of the Rule of Law Program at Stanford Law 
School. 
2. I use the phrase “rule-of-law assistance” to refer to the judicial and legal reform programs of multi-
lateral development banks, international development agencies, and private foundations. Examples of 
each are the World Bank, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the 
Ford Foundation. 
3. Erik G. Jensen & Thomas C. Heller, Introduction, in Beyond Common Knowledge, supra note 1, 
at 1–2. 
4. Id. The rule of law has gained momentum over the last decade in both economic and legal ªelds. 
Examples of works within law and development literature that also take a critical approach to the rule-of-
law orthodoxy include Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule of Law Orthodoxy (Carnegie Endowment, 
Rule of Law Series: Democracy and the Rule of Law Project, Working Paper No. 30, 2002), available at 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/ªles/wp30.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2006) (questioning, from a socio-
legal empirical perspective, the validity of the rule-of-law, governance, and development paradigm); 
Stephen Golub, Beyond Rule of Law Orthodoxy: The Legal Empowerment Alternative (Carnegie Endowment, 
Rule of Law Series: Democracy and the Rule of Law Project, Working Paper No. 41, 2003), available at 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/ªles/wp41.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2006) (articulating a “legal 
empowerment” paradigm based on human capabilities and bottom-up advocacy); and the important 
forthcoming volume of critical essays in The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical 
Appraisal (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., forthcoming 2006) [hereinafter Trubek & Santos] 
(taking a legal realist/post-realist perspective on the current law and development thinking and practice). 
For more mainstream studies of the rule-of-law revival, see generally Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law 
Revival, 77 Foreign Aff., Mar.–Apr. 1998, at 95, and Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy 
Abroad: The Learning Curve (1999). 
5. The aim of this enterprise is to suggest “how to diagnose problems, develop baselines of perform-
ance, analyze the dynamics of reform, and measure and evaluate the development of legal systems.” Jen-
sen & Heller, supra note 3, at 2. 
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mented by a strong normative argument. To deliver tangible outcomes in 
the area of development, global poverty, and inequality, ROLA should be 
conceived within a critical pragmatic approach that integrates empirical in-
sights with progressive normative views. In this Book Review, I advocate for 
an approach that combines empiricism, normative critique, and pragmatic 
advocacy to articulate and advance a more progressive ROLA framework and 
agenda. 
Beyond Common Knowledge is a collection of essays and case studies analyz-
ing rule-of-law reform and the role of judicial systems and their alternatives 
across the world. These studies seek to test widespread doctrinal hypotheses 
about the role of legal and judicial systems in economic growth and democ-
ratic politics and assess the current practice of ROLA. What is unique about 
the book is its openly empirical approach that seeks to move ROLA dis-
course beyond discussions about the philosophical meaning of access to jus-
tice and the rule of law or the political biases of ROLA discourse. In classic 
law and society fashion, each author in this volume supports his or her analysis 
with empirical research, country or cross-country case studies of judicial sys-
tems, and a strong emphasis on political economy analysis. The various studies 
offer insightful conclusions, and some provoking thoughts. They include a case 
and methodology for evaluating systems of justice through public opinion 
polls (José Juan Toharia, chapter 1); a comparative law and society study of ju-
dicial systems in Western Europe (Erhard Blankenburg, chapter 2); empirical 
assessments of informal justice (Marc Galanter and Jayanth K. Krishnan, chap-
ter 3) and special consumer courts (Robert S. Moog, chapter 4) in India; in-
novative approaches to empirical research about the Chinese judiciary (Donald 
C. Clarke, chapter 5 and Hualing Fu, chapter 6); political economy analyses 
of ROLA (Jensen, chapter 10, and Heller, chapter 11); judicial reform programs 
in Latin America (Linn Hammergren, chapter 9, on Latin America generally, 
Carlos Pena Gonzalez, chapter 7, on Chile, and Héctor Fix-Fierro, chapter 8, on 
Mexico). 
Beyond Common Knowledge addresses ROLA’s uneven empirical record and 
calls for its systematic evaluation through new empirical research standards.6 
These standards can examine what courts and their alternatives actually do 
and monitor and measure the progress of ROLA reforms. Pointing generally 
to the limited impact of and resources for judicial and legal reforms,7 the 
book calls for a more “modest” and “thin” ROLA agenda that would focus on 
less ambitious intermediate level outcomes, such as improving court transpar-
 
                                                                                                                      
6. See Linn Hammergren, International Assistance to Latin American Justice Programs: Towards an Agenda 
for Reforming the Reformers, in Beyond Common Knowledge, supra note 1, at 290, 290–335. 
7. Running through the volume is an important discussion about the absolute value of “governance 
through law” with regard to alternative and potentially more effective mechanisms for carrying out eco-
nomic development. See Carlos Peña Gonzalez, Economic and Political Aspects of Judicial Reform: The Chilean 
Case, in Beyond Common Knowledge, supra note 1, at 220, 222–25 (arguing for cost-beneªt analysis 
of ROLA); Hammergren, supra note 6, at 319 (stating that the absence of systematic evaluation of ROLA 
programs is “an invitation for continued waste”). 
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ency and court management for everyday cases.8 The book argues for a shift 
away from ROLA’s “judicial centrism” and the doctrinal belief in independent 
judiciaries,9 for ROLA actors to recognize informal and alternative dispute 
resolution (“ADR”) processes outside of the formal judicial system, and for a 
deeper understanding of local legal culture and political economy.10 
Although the authors in Beyond Common Knowledge assess and criticize the 
gap between articulated ROLA goals and practice,11 they self-consciously pri-
oritize a “realistic” and improving-the-record approach to meeting modest, 
intermediate level rule-of-law objectives as the way ahead.12 Hence, with the 
notable exception of Heller’s postscript chapter, which articulates a paradigm 
for governance and ROLA within existing institutional “ecologies,”13 the 
authors in this volume fall short of articulating a strong normative frame-
work for ROLA. 
Part I of this Book Review will discuss the broad outline of a critical 
pragmatic approach to ROLA that combines the empiricism found in Beyond 
Common Knowledge with a normative vision for attacking global poverty. Part II 
explores “selling” pro-poor programs within ROLA standard packages. Part 
III concludes. 
I. Poverty Advocacy and ROLA: A Critical Pragmatic Approach 
While Beyond Common Knowledge sets an agenda for assessing and reforming 
ROLA practice, it rejects on empirical grounds both the idea of articulating 
“higher level” normative goals for ROLA and any deeper critical discussion 
on the theoretical and political biases of rule-of-law and development dis-
courses. 
 
                                                                                                                      
8. Jensen & Heller, supra note 3, at 3. 
9. See Erik J. Jensen, The Rule of Law and Judicial Reform: The Political Economy of Diverse Institutional 
Patterns and Reformers’ Responses, in Beyond Common Knowledge, supra note 1, at 336, 336–38; Tho-
mas C. Heller, An Immodest Postscript, in Beyond Common Knowledge, supra note 1, at 382, 401–02 
(arguing that although the concept of “autonomy” has insulated judiciaries from political power, it often 
leads to uncontrolled corruption practices when added to the “local ownership” principle adopted by 
ROLA agencies). 
10. Jensen & Heller, supra note 3, at 3. Heller goes even further to suggest that ROLA actors abandon 
their focus on local ownership by vested legal elites and consider disrupting “the incentives of currently 
empowered legal actors who have both owned and exhausted the rule of law for decades” by questioning 
the necessary and absolute public good nature of the judiciary. Heller, supra note 9, at 406; see also Peña 
Gonzalez, supra note 7, at 222–25 (arguing that analysis of the success of judicial reforms should be based 
on examinations of the political process involved and of the underlying public policy). For those familiar 
with the history of law and development, the promotion of a deeper understanding of local legal culture 
is reminiscent of the sentiments surrounding the “self-estrangement” period in law and development that 
followed the ªrst U.S.-based law and development movement of the 1960s. See generally David M. Trubek 
& Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reºections on the Crisis in Law and Development, 1974 
Wis. L. Rev. 1062. 
11. Jensen & Heller, supra note 3, at 2–4 (pointing to “the accretion of doctrine-based expectations on 
the development of legal systems; the weak empirical basis that supports those expectations; and the 
disconnection between the articulated goals of the projects on the one hand and the reality of the inter-
ventions on the other”). 
12. See Heller, supra note 9, at 405. 
13. Id. at 390–94. 
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The eschewing of such normative positioning risks undermining the value 
of the empirical, political economy-based analysis of ROLA in Beyond Com-
mon Knowledge. In other words, there should be a more critically engaged and 
clearly articulated normative agenda in addition to—and beyond—the in-
valuable empirical critique provided by Beyond Common Knowledge. 
Speciªcally, a case should be made, upon both normative and empirical 
grounds, for both supporting and critically engaging the current re-focusing 
of ROLA discourse on poverty and inclusion. Although most multilateral 
development banks (“MDBs”) and development agencies have recently rein-
troduced a vocabulary of poverty or “extreme” poverty “alleviation,” “reduc-
tion,” or “eradication,”14 as well as concepts of participation or deliberation into 
their rhetoric, the practice of ROLA, as highlighted in Beyond Common Knowl-
edge, remains relatively unchanged and geared mainly toward market-induced 
economic growth objectives. Pro-poor programs, such as support to access-to-
justice programs and civil society advocacy groups,15 are still marginalized, 
even within agencies claiming to have adopted a “human” or “rights-based” 
version of development.16 Beyond Common Knowledge accurately recounts this 
reality, as well as the many political-economy obstacles to the realization and 
sustainability of pro-poor programs in ROLA.17 However, the lack of such 
programs in ROLA practice ought to be more forcefully criticized, and a 
strong case can be made to support the funding and development of the most 
innovative, experimental, and inclusive of these programs. 
The post–Washington Consensus18 shift from market growth to market fail-
ures, local institutional trajectories, poverty, freedom, and capabilities has trans-
 
                                                                                                                      
14. See generally Jeffrey Sachs, The End of Poverty (2004) (arguing for a big push policy of re-
source transfers from the developed world to poor countries, a policy, which if informed by economic 
knowledge and modern science, could achieve the eradication of widespread diseases and extreme poverty 
in these societies). 
15. Examples of pro-poor access-to-justice programs include legal aid programs, legal literacy pro-
grams, ADR, support for public interest law, and civil society advocacy organizations. For a discussion of 
pro-poor access-to-justice programs, see Jeremy Perelman The Way Ahead? Access-To-Justice, Public Interest 
Lawyering and the Right to Legal Aid in South Africa: The Nkuzi Case, 41 Stan. J. Int’l L. (forthcoming 
2006). 
16. The rights-based approach to development seeks to integrate political freedom and equity con-
cerns both as means to induce economic growth and alleviate poverty, as well as normative objectives on 
their own. On the rights-based approach to development, see Andre Frankovits, Rules To Live By: The 
Human Rights Approach to Development, Praxis: Fletcher J. Dev. Stud. 9, 9–17 (2002). See also Peter 
Uvin, Human Rights and Development, 167–78 (2004) (arguing for and conceptualizing a genuine 
rights-based approach to development practice, which would go beyond the rhetorical inclusion of hu-
man rights norms in development literature and discourse); Peter Uvin, On High Moral Ground: The 
Incorporation of Human Rights by the Development Enterprise, Praxis: Fletcher J. Dev. Stud. 19, 19–26 
(2002). For an example of a development agency that has adopted a human development and rights-based 
approach to development, see United Nations Development Programme, Human Development 
Report 2000: Human Rights and Human Development 17 (2000) (discussing the adoption of the 
human development approach by the UNDP in the 1990s, which redeªned development in terms of 
human development or development measured not only by GDP growth, but also by measures of mortal-
ity, health, and education). 
17. See, e.g., Erik G. Jensen, The Rule of Law and Judicial Reform: The Political Economy of Reverse Institu-
tional Patterns and Reformers’ Responses, in Beyond Common Knowledge, supra note 1, at 336, 350–57. 
18. The term “Washington Consensus” was coined by John Williamson in 1989 and is generally used 
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lated into the current ROLA rhetoric.19 This shift, even if only rhetorical, 
should be recognized as a progressive doctrinal step away from neoliberalism. 
Further normative critique as to the distributive underpinnings of the cur-
rent development and ROLA discourses, combined with empirical research as 
presented in Beyond Common Knowledge, could ultimately alter the mere “lip-
service” function of pro-poor programs within the well-endowed20 ROLA pack-
ages.21 Whether ROLA programs are best suited to eliminate economic and 
other forms of poverty, invent new forms of inclusive democratic citizen set-
tings, deliver sustainable and inclusive economic growth, or even sustain a 
liberal formal “rule of law” remains debatable both theoretically and empiri-
cally. But by tapping into both the theoretical realm of the normative debate 
about the nature of “development” and ROLA and into the empirical realm of 
observed gaps and political economy analysis, a more coherent argument 
could be articulated to place poverty and inequality at the center of ROLA.22 
Hence, a critical pragmatic approach to poverty advocacy should: (1) acknowl-
edge the current doctrinal and policy shifts in ROLA as liberal but progres-
 
                                                                                                                      
to refer to the Bretton Woods institutions’ policies after the debt crisis of 1982, when the development 
community considered that priority should be given to economic growth through export-oriented struc-
tural adjustment, which would allow for foreign currency ºows and debt reimbursements. John William-
son, A Short History of the Washington Consensus 7 (Fundación CIDOB, 2004), available at http://www.iie. 
com/publications/papers/williamson0904-2.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2006). 
19. David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos, An Introduction: The Third Moment in Law and Development The-
ory and the Emergence of a New Critical Practice, in Trubek & Santos, supra note 4, at 5–7. The post–
Washington Consensus model of development is characterized by sequenced privatization, attention to 
local ownership and pacing of reform, a renewed focus on domestic markets, safeguards against the nega-
tive effects of rushing transition to an open economy, limited state intervention in case of market failure, 
targeted poverty, health, and education safety nets and the acceptance of local institutional variations. See 
Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far? 69–85 (1997). The development paradigm has 
been inºuenced by the emergence of Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach, as presented in Amartya K. 
Sen, Development as Capability Expansion, in Human Development and the International Devel-
opment Strategy for the 1990s 41, 54–56 (K. Grifªn & J. Knight eds., 1990) (arguing for a capa-
bilities approach to development that reconciles civil and political rights and socioeconomic rights 
(“SER”) by integrating them as constitutive and interdependent ends and means of development, deªned 
as the enhancement of the freedom and capabilities of individuals to gain control over decisions affecting 
what they value in life). The rights-based approach to development integrates the rule of law as a tool to 
achieve human development, rejects the earlier development/rights trade-off paradigm, and integrates 
formerly neglected SER as ofªcial policy goals and benchmarks to measure human development. See also 
Amartya K. Sen, Development as Freedom, 52–57, 128–37 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2001) (Knopf 1999) 
[hereinafter Sen, Development as Freedom]. 
20. For diverse political economy-related reasons, such as the relative political neutrality of rule-of-
law and good governance discourses, ROLA has attracted important and ongoing ªnancial ºows. Jensen, 
supra note 9, at 347; see also Richard E. Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development: A Survey of the 
Issues, 14 World Bank Research Observer 117, 117 (1999) (estimating the amount invested by 
MDBs in judicial reform projects in twenty-six countries during the late 1990s at $500 million, while 
USAID would have invested $200 million before that). The overall ªgure for World Bank rule-of-law 
programs over the last decade is estimated at almost USD $3 billion. David Trubek, The “Rule of Law” in 
Development Assistance: Past, Present, and Future, in Trubek & Santos, supra note 4, at 68. 
21. See Jensen, supra note 9, at 350 (“Lip-service interventions always ªnd their way into donor re-
ports, but they receive very little if any MDB funding.”). 
22. Imagining a subsequent and complementary volume to the one reviewed, I would modestly sug-
gest the following as a title: Beyond Uncommon Empiricism: Normative Aspirations for the Rule of Law—
Replacing Poverty and Inequality at the Center of Rule-of-Law Assistance. 
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sive; (2) point out the remaining theoretical ºaws of its doctrine and call for 
more inclusive, egalitarian values and better critical understanding of the 
concepts of “rights” and “development”; (3) utilize the empirical political econ-
omy analysis presented in Beyond Common Knowledge to denounce the lack of 
genuinely pro-poor programs within ROLA; and (4) advocate funding efforts 
for experimental, inclusive, and people-based pro-poor ROLA programs. 
While the authors in Beyond Common Knowledge effectively highlight the 
gap between articulated ROLA goals and practice, there is little open dis-
cussion about the deeper theoretical assumptions and political biases em-
bedded in development discourse and ROLA rhetoric.23 A critique of the cur-
rent “Third Moment doctrine”24 of law and development and its focus on 
ROLA can and should be made both to enrich the theoretical debate25 and 
 
                                                                                                                      
23. A notable exception is Heller, supra note 9. In his account of the role of law in development the-
ory, Heller suggests that the standard rule-of-law package that emerged from the latest ROLA wave is 
directed at “building up the capacity of courts and lawyers to substitute adjudication for administration 
and to manage the increased ºows of new economic and constitutional demands expected to arise from 
privatization, marketization, and democratization.” Id. at 384. This means that “[t]he rule of law remains 
principally about improving the quantity (number and productivity) and quality (autonomy, pay scales, 
and skills) of a largely existing court system under the partially articulated theory that well-functioning 
legal institutions are essential to markets and democracy, and that these, in turn, deªne the possibilities 
of successful development.” Id. He calls for an “integrated” rule-of-law, development, and democracy 
theory that would include the latest insights of development economics (coordination between private 
actors and the shift to poverty alleviation) and democracy theory (deliberative democracy and democratic 
experimentalism). Id. at 390–92, 405. 
24. See Trubek & Santos, supra note 19, at 1–5, pointing to the history of the law and development 
movement as three “moments”—the “Law and Developmental State” moment of the 1950s–60s, the 
“Law and the Neoliberal Market” moment of the 1980s and early 1990s, and the current “Third Mo-
ment” emerging paradigm. In the neoliberal model, the rule of law was conceived under a conservative 
and formalist economic constitutionalism scheme focused on the law of the market, where the judicial 
system was seen as key to facilitating market transactions, private-sector development, and foreign direct 
investment with “little concern” for law as a guarantor of freedom or as “protector of the weak and disad-
vantaged.” Contrastingly, the “Third Moment” is related to a broader critique and “chastening” of neo-
liberal models that recognizes market failures and broadens the deªnition of development from narrow 
economic growth to include notions of freedom and capabilities. Id. at 2. The “Third Moment” doctrine 
“accepts the use of law not only to create and protect markets, but also to curb market excess, support the 
social, and provide direct relief to the poor” through targeted programs and safety nets. In this context 
the judiciary remains important but in a different way: “since the judiciary is now linked to poverty 
reduction and the social, it is important to provide access to justice to those most in need.” Id. at 7. 
25. Beyond Common Knowledge can be viewed as one type of critique pertaining to the “Third Moment” 
of law and development: an in-house, empirical, political economy, and law and society critique of the 
current ROLA “standard package.” Examples include the contributions of ROLA insiders, such as Ham-
mergren (World Bank) or Jensen (Asia Foundation), and those of famous law and society scholars, such as 
Blankenburg, Toharia, Fix-Fierro and Galanter. For a more normative critique of the “Third Moment” of 
law and development, see Trubek & Santos, supra note 4, at 6–11 (pointing out the embedded assump-
tions and political biases of the current law and development movement). Written from a legal real-
ist/post-realist perspective, Trubek & Santos’s book points out the distributional consequences of the 
current rule-of-law orthodoxy, the commonly held assumptions about formalism and law (e.g., its neu-
trality) that characterize this orthodoxy, and the consequences of the rule of law becoming an objective of 
development in itself. See also David Kennedy, Laws and Developments, in Law and Development: Fac-
ing Complexity in the 21st Century 17 (Amanda Perry-Kessaris & John Hatchard eds., 2003) 
(criticizing the latest rule-of-law momentum as being based on the assumption that choosing law could 
substitute for complex political and economic choices pertaining to development policy). Overall, the 
legal realist/post-realist position raises important questions about the depth of the shift in law and devel-
opment thinking away from neoliberalism, questioning whether the current doctrine can move beyond the 
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to help shape a progressive paradigm for the law and development move-
ment. 
Poverty, inequality, and the inclusion of disempowered groups in society 
and collective decision-making should be pushed to the center of ROLA think-
ing. In the area of access to justice, for example, the conceptual debate that 
has been raging for decades ought to be more forcefully transposed to ROLA. 
Access to justice, a broad label widely used to describe some of the pro-poor 
programs found within the latest ROLA standard policy packages,26 is situated 
at the center of the current law and development doctrine, because it suppos-
edly links economic development, democratic freedom, and inclusion.27 In 
Beyond Common Knowledge, Heller and Jensen provide revealing political econ-
omy analyses suggesting that the ªnancing of pro-poor access-to-justice pro-
grams is mostly symbolic28 (partly due to the incentive structures within donor 
assistance29), which explains the lack of “penetration” of positive ROLA re-
forms.30 Although Jensen questions the viability31 and sustainability of these 
 
                                                                                                                      
neoliberal tensions between economic constitutionalism and democratic empowerment, objective eco-
nomic efªciency and distributional implications, and “rule of the law for the market” and “rule of the law 
for poverty reduction and emancipation.” It is argued that the rule of law, conceived within the current 
paradigm as an end to development in itself, may indeed serve liberal as well as conservative agendas. For 
a similar analysis on the tensions between economic constitutionalism and poverty alleviation, see Heller, 
supra note 9, at 391. 
26. The standard access-to-justice package includes administration of justice, court efªciency, and case 
management programs (speed of justice), court infrastructure, e-justice programs, legal education as well 
as publicly funded individual legal aid systems (cost of justice), and ADR or procedural simpliªcation 
programs. Other access-to-justice labeled activities include legal literacy and support to public interest 
law and civil society advocacy organizations. On the standard access-to-justice package, see Jensen, supra 
note 9, at 345–52. 
27. The ofªcial MDB literature of recent years suggests a link between access to justice, democracy, 
and market-induced economic growth. See, e.g., World Bank, World Development Report 2002: 
Building Institutions for Markets 131, available at http://www.worldbank.org/wdr/2001/fulltext/ 
ch6.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2006). For Jensen, the rationale behind the centrality of access to justice to 
ROLA is an “emerging global consensus that broader citizen participation is integral to stronger democ-
ratic practices.” Jensen, supra note 9, at 354. For a historical approach to the access-to-justice movement 
and its intersection with the law and development movement, see Perelman, supra note 15. 
28. Jensen, supra note 9, at 349–52 (suggesting that ROLA standard packages even in their latest 
“holistic” version remain primarily a set of access-to-justice labelled and resource-intensive judicial infra-
structure projects aimed at enforcing rights enforcement and predictability). 
29. Id. at 350–52 (suggesting that one reason for the permanence and preeminence of large loans for 
judicial infrastructure in ROLA is related to the political economy and institutional incentive structures 
of donor assistance, which favors the disbursement of big loans rather than small grants to recipient 
governments; this is particularly true of MDBs but less of development agencies and foundations). 
30. Heller, supra note 9, at 399–405 (recognizing positive structural changes fostered at the na-
tional/capital levels by the emergence of constitutional courts and associated bodies such as ombudsmen, 
human rights, and electoral commissions, but pointing to the lack of ROLA impact at lower levels partly 
due to the lack of “penetration”). Heller argues that ROLA has been “unable to extend reforms and in-
centives that have changed behavior in the upper courts to the lower courts, where the mass of people in 
developing nations encounter the law.” Id. at 399. 
31. Although Jensen recognizes that well-funded and organized networks of NGOs can sometimes 
have a positive impact on reform, he sheds doubt on their capacity to mobilize and represent broad con-
sistuencies. Jensen, supra note 9, at 354–55. Jensen questions their motivations and points out the recur-
rent problem of collective action. Id. at 354. For an explanation of collective action, see Mancur Olson, 
The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (1965). 
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pro-poor programs,32 the authors in Beyond Common Knowledge do not directly 
engage with the normative debate surrounding access to justice and poverty 
advocacy. 
Two types of critiques have been made against the access-to-justice con-
cept. First, the law and economics approach has questioned the cost efªciency of 
traditional legal aid entitlement systems with regard to other more cost-efª-
cient systems.33 Second, scholars and activists on the left have criticized tra-
ditional access-to-justice programs (such as individualized legal aid, ADR, and 
court efªciency programs) for being narrowly directed at procedural access 
rather than substantive justice.34 Indeed, if justice is to be deªned as social 
change, wealth redistribution, poverty alleviation, or even the enhancement of 
human capabilities, access to a formal judicial system may not be the best 
way to achieve it; greater court access will not mitigate poverty in countries 
where law entrenches social, political, and economic exclusion. From this per-
spective, access to the market preempts access to justice.35 
Scholars and practitioners of poverty law in the United States have sug-
gested a shift to more client-centered alternative models which prioritize col-
laborative lawyering, community action, social movements, and political strug-
gle over formalist access-to-the-courtroom model attempts to induce social 
change.36 
This conceptual critique has been echoed in developing countries by alterna-
tive law groups and civil society NGOs, which reject traditional legal aid as 
a “band-aid” and aim for deeper structural change. An example of such NGO-
lawyering, which is supported mostly by international funds (private foun-
dations and, increasingly, bilateral agencies), is socioeconomic rights lawyer-
ing.37 Drawing on the mobilizing potential of socioeconomic rights (“SER”), 
 
                                                                                                                      
32. See Jensen, supra note 9, at 354–55. 
33. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, The Law and Economics of Judicial Systems, PREM Note No. 26 (World 
Bank, Washington, D.C.), July 1999, at 1, available at http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/ 
PREMnote26.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2006) (suggesting that a system of no-fault automobile insurance 
provides compensation to more accident victims at less cost than permitting each injured individual to 
bring suit for damages). 
34. For a discussion of various concepts and waves of access to justice, see Perelman, supra note 15. 
35. Trubek & Santos, supra note 4, at 180, 192 (showing how access to justice is still conceived in 
mainstream development thinking as access to efªcient courts for purposes of market-induced economic 
growth). 
36. There is vast literature on cause lawyering, progressive lawyering, and collaborative lawyering. See, 
e.g., Paolo Freire, Pedegogy of the Oppressed (Myra Bergman Ramos trans., 1984) (theorizing 
popular education); Robert Mangabeira Unger, Democracy Realized: The Progressive Alter-
native (1998) (discussing democratic experimentalism); Gary Bellow, Steady Work: A Practitioner’s 
Reºections on Political Lawyering, 31 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 297 (1996); Jody Freeman & Laura I. Lang-
bein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Beneªt, 9 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 60 (2000) (discussing regula-
tory negotiation); Gerald López, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious 
Collaboration, 77 Geo. L.J. 1603 (1989); Lucie E. White, Creating Models for Progressive Lawyering in the 
21st Century, 9 J.L. & Pol’y 297, 308 (2001); Lucie E. White, Collaborative Lawyering in the Field? On 
Mapping the Paths from Rhetoric to Practice, 1 Clinical L. Rev. 157 (1994). 
37. I use the term “socioeconomic rights lawyering” generally to designate the practice of public in-
terest lawyering organizations that have articulated their action around the concept and norms of SER. 
SER lawyering practices include targeted or developmental legal aid programs, structural developmental 
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advocates in developing countries have engaged in constitutional-level im-
pact litigation as well as bottom-up community action.38 
Although Beyond Common Knowledge sheds a realistic light on the political 
economy obstacles to the development of this type of advocacy and pro-poor 
programs generally within ROLA,39 the theoretical critique and political debate 
surrounding the value of ROLA and access to justice vis-à-vis global poverty 
alleviation should not be overlooked or abandoned. Rather, the two critiques 
should complement each other. 
As Trubek and Santos suggest, the current doctrine of the “Third Moment” 
of law and development is not entirely deªned yet, and constitutes a mix of 
many elements along the political spectrum.40 Critical questioning of both 
the shift away from a neoliberal paradigm and the liberal assumptions em-
bedded in current rule-of-law thinking is thus important.41 For example, the 
currently fashionable rights-based approach to development should be 
criticized when it becomes a mere formalistic exercise of including a lim-
ited set of rights in development rhetoric, or when it does not critically examine 
the very concepts of development and rights on which it rests.42 Even the 
vocabulary of “pro-poor strategies” and poverty “alleviation” or “targeting,” in-
creasingly used in the current paradigm, can be criticized for embedding and 
crystallizing a normative shift from equality to poverty alleviation—i.e., a shift 
 
                                                                                                                      
rights impact litigation, or critical pragmatic community-based action for SER and legal empowerment 
approaches. For a discussion on SER lawyering and the debates around SER in rights-based development, 
see Perelman, supra note 15. 
38. Examples include the Legal Resources Center’s successful engagement in public interest constitu-
tional litigation in South Africa on the rights to housing and health. See, e.g., Government of RSA v. 
Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.); Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (5) 
SA 721 (CC) (S. Afr.). On cause lawyering in the Third World, see generally Stephen Ellmann, Cause 
Lawyering in the Third World, in Cause Lawyering: Political Commitments and Professional 
Responsibilities 349 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998). 
39. See Heller, supra note 9, at 397–99 (critiquing court-induced change from a political economy 
standpoint by pointing to the judiciary’s lack of capacity in developing countries to enforce important 
SER decisions at the level of the poor in the absence of civil society pressure). Heller also argues that the 
activist attitude of judges in some countries—like South Africa—does not necessarily signal a shift away 
from the traditional and conservative deference of the judiciary to executive power and the “history of 
institutional dualism” in most developing countries. 
40. Trubek & Santos, supra note 4, at 4–7, 10–14. The political right clings to a “chastened” Wash-
ington Consensus, focusing on courts as mediators and facilitators of market activity. The political left 
sees law as a tool to empower the poor, and ROLA as a potential but limited means of doing so. Id.  
41. Id.  
42. For a forceful critique of the human rights paradigm and the concept of development from a social 
movement and Third World perspective, see Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law From 
Below: Development, Social Movements and Third World Resistance 248 (2003) (suggesting 
that the rights-based approach to development has failed to provide a transformational potential to Third 
World societies, because use of “the language of rights is limited within its rationalistic and disciplinary 
terms, which emphasize individual autonomy over relationships and trust . . . . Rights discourse, with its 
historical connection to ideas of property and sovereignty, had to be replaced with other strategies or 
discourses, in order to get over its conservative inºuence”). See also Trubek & Santos, supra note 4, at 6 
(suggesting that interpretations of “rights in development” will vary, because “[f]or some, human rights 
might mean limiting state action while others might deploy a more expansive notion. The same termi-
nology of human rights can be used to promote the interests of oppressed minorities and holders of prop-
erty.”). 
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away from genuine solidarity.43 Poverty—even redeªned as capability depriva-
tion44—remains largely conceived as a byproduct of economic growth, while 
inequality is still often conceived as a necessary step toward development.45 
As important as it is to complement any empirical approach, this critical 
theoretical take on ROLA and development ought to be placed in a critical 
pragmatic perspective, which would recognize the doctrinal and policy shifts 
of the current moment as progressive steps. The recognition of market fail-
ures and the move toward poverty alleviation and capabilities as overarching 
goals of development represent progressive steps of this last decade, and 
critical thinking should acknowledge them as such. As Beyond Common Knowl-
edge shows, the current focus on poverty-alleviation in ROLA may well be 
only rhetorical. The shift in discourse, however, should not be entirely dis-
carded. The political economy of ROLA is a complex interaction between donor 
countries, MDB personnel, recipient governments, and vested legal elites, 
and the debates at theoretical and political levels can inºuence the ROLA 
agenda and consequently its practice. If pro-poor access-to-justice programs 
are mere lip-service today, they were almost completely absent from MDBs’ 
standard packages a decade ago. In other words, the normative, political, and 
theoretical debates on capabilities and human development that took place 
within MDBs and among ROLA players over the last decade did have an 
inºuence in the inclusion of pro-poor programs in ROLA—even if the pro-
grams remain liberally conceived and marginally practiced. No matter how 
incremental, this shift in the broader development agenda toward a less neo-
liberal paradigm must be both acknowledged and supported at the policy-
making level.46 
II. “Selling” Pro-Poor Programs 
The main problem of how to “sell” speciªcally pro-poor programs to ROLA 
constituencies remains. Lawyers have assumed an important place in devel-
opment agencies and MDBs with high-level decision-making and consult-
ing positions.47 Lawyers’ prominence in development agencies increases the 
 
                                                                                                                      
43. For an excellent critical analysis of the neoliberal ideological biases behind the ideas of market 
efªciency and neutrality, the structural distributional consequences of property rights-oriented economic 
policies, and the normative shift from reducing inequality to alleviating poverty in development policy 
for post-communist transition, see Kerry Rittich, Recharacterizing Restructuring: Gender 
and Distribution in the Legal Structure of Market Reform (2002). 
44. Sen, Development as Freedom, supra note 19, at 87. 
45. See generally Growth, Inequality, and Poverty: Prospects for Pro-Poor Economic De-
velopment (Anthony Shorrocks & Rolph van der Hoeven eds., 2004) (presenting the debate regarding 
the links between inequality, poverty, and growth in development economics). 
46. Compare The World Bank, World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development 
(2006), with The World Bank, World Development Report 2006: Building Institutions for 
Markets (2002). 
47. This, in addition to the massive ªnancial ºow invested in ROLA over the last decade, is due in 
great part to the importance of ROLA and “good governance” discourses within the development indus-
try. For an excellent analysis of the use of rule of law and good governance discourses by and within the 
World Bank, see Alvaro Santos, The World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of Law” Promise in Economic Development, 
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importance placed on law-centered programs. Notwithstanding the empiri-
cal question raised by Beyond Common Knowledge of whether law-centered pro-
grams are necessarily relevant to achieve development goals, ROLA programs 
remain well-endowed. The goal is therefore pragmatic: convince ROLA con-
stituencies to transfer increased funding to pro-poor ROLA programs by show-
ing that these are necessary and even “efªcient.” 
One way to capture the current liberal mainstream constituency in devel-
opment agencies and MDBs would be to propose original models of access to 
justice. Traditional legal aid programs, even if questionable in their “band-
aid” function, are accepted by this liberal constituency. This conceptual and 
political support is a ªrst step and should not to be dismissed lightly. How-
ever, an additional effort should be made to conceptualize and advocate for 
original legal-aid schemes that can be geared toward helping poor people 
directly. 
An example of this approach can be found in South Africa, where a mixed 
model of legal services delivery has been implemented since the end of apart-
heid. This model, centered on publicly funded “Justice Centers,” includes 
internationally funded civil society and community-based paralegal organi-
zations within the delivery of legal services scheme.48 Like those in many devel-
oping countries, the legal aid scheme in South Africa prioritizes criminal 
cases.49 Yet marginalized people also require legal assistance in speciªc civil 
matters, such as land titling or land tenure evictions. The South African 
legal aid community has attempted to deal with this problem by acknowledg-
ing the problem of resource scarcity, a constraint familiar to any legal aid 
scheme. In a recent case before the Land Claims Court, the South African 
Legal Resources Center (“LRC”), a prominent public interest law ªrm funded 
partly by ROLA donors, argued on behalf of a local NGO for a right to legal 
aid for people whose security of land tenure is threatened or has been in-
fringed. In a concerted strategy with the LRC, the plaintiff suggested to the 
court an original solution: the funding of a focused (legal aid for land ten-
ants), development (land rights) and context-sensitive (post-apartheid redis-
tribution of land) legal services delivery by a partially private and internationally 
funded “Rural Legal Trust.”50 Such a nuanced approach allowed the LRC to 
overcome some of the legitimacy, justiciability, and budgetary arguments gen-
erally advanced against the recognition of such a right. Such locally informed 
and pragmatic approaches, even if highly contextualized and limited in 
terms of structural change or wider redistributive goals,51 could be proposed to 
ROLA programmers and donors more broadly. 
 
                                                                                                                      
in Trubek & Santos, supra note 4, at 216, 254. 
48. Perelman, supra note 15. 
49. Id. 
50. Nkuzi Dev. Ass’n. v. S. Afr. & Legal Aid Bd., LCC 10/01 (2002), available at http://wwwserver. 
law.wits.ac.za/lcc/ªles/nkuzi/nkuzi.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2006). For commentary on this case, see 
generally Perelman, supra note 15. 
51. Id. Part IV. 
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Another interesting concept is Stephen Golub’s recently articulated “legal 
empowerment” paradigm, which reºects a practitioner-academic’s critique of 
ROLA and classic access-to-justice schemes based on both theoretical and em-
pirical insights.52 Like Jensen and Heller, Golub suggests going beyond the 
“rule of law orthodoxy,” albeit via a normative paradigm shift toward a “le-
gal empowerment alternative,”53 deªned as “the use of legal services and related 
development activities to increase disadvantaged populations’ control over 
their lives.”54 Situated along the lines of Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach 
and drawing on civil society and community development literature,55 legal 
empowerment, “a manifestation of community-driven and rights-based devel-
opment, is grounded in grassroots needs and activities, but can also translate 
community-level work into impact on national laws and institutions.”56 The 
paradigm focuses on civil society as “the best route to strengthening the legal 
capacities and power of the poor”57 but aims to work with, or put pressure 
on, state and local ofªcials. It seeks to address a major failure of ROLA—a 
lack of enforcement of laws that beneªt the poor—and emphasizes a bottom-
up, local-needs-based, and multi-level-strategy approach. These strategies in-
clude, but are not limited to, legal services, and feature ROLA practitioners 
 
                                                                                                                      
52. Stephen Golub & Kim McQuay, Legal Empowerment: Advancing Good Governance and Poverty Reduc-
tion, in Law and Policy Reform at the Asian Development Bank (2001), available at http://www. 
adb.org/Documents/Others/Law_ADB/lpr_2001.asp?p=lawdevt (last visited Apr. 17, 2006). 
53. Golub, supra note 4, at 5, 11 (referring to “rule-of-law orthodoxy” as coined by Upham, supra note 
4, at 3, who characterizes rule-of-law orthodoxy as contending “that sustainable growth is impossible 
without the existence of the rule of law: a set of uniformly enforced, established legal regimes that clearly 
lay out the rules of the game”). 
54. Id. at 25. Golub’s critique of ROLA can be situated somewhere between the in-house, empirical 
assessment critique represented by Beyond Common Knowledge and the legal realist/post-realist literature, as 
he addresses exclusively neither the problematic political distributional choices of rule-of-law thinking 
nor a “thinner” rule of law and more modest and empirically assessed goals and programs. Golub sug-
gests that ROLA “focuses too much on law, lawyers, and state institutions, and too little on development, 
the poor and civil society.” Id. at 5. He questions the “questionable assumptions, unproven impact, and 
insufªcient attention to the legal needs of the disadvantaged” of the rule-of-law orthodoxy and rejects its 
“top-down,” state-centered approach focused on law reform, the judiciary, and the building of “business-
friendly legal systems that presumably spur poverty alleviation.” Id. 
55. Id. at 27 n.83 (referring to civil society and development literature, which highlights “the impor-
tance of civil society capacity building, organization, or political inºuence in improving the lives of the 
disadvantaged”). See generally David Brown & Darcy Ashman, Participation, Social Capital, Intersectoral 
Problem Solving: African and Asian Cases, 24 World Dev. 1467 (1996) (analyzing thirteen cases of inter-
sectoral cooperation between NGOs, international donors, and public agencies); Michael Edwards, NGO 
Performance—What Breeds Success? New Evidence from South Asia, 27 World Dev. 361 (1999) (arguing that 
enhancing the livelihoods of poor people depends on NGO successes in fostering autonomous grassroots 
institutions and linking them with higher-level markets and political structures); Michael Edwards & 
David Hulme, Scaling-up the Development Impact of NGOs: Concepts and Experiences, in Making a Differ-
ence: NGOs and Development in a Changing World 13 (Edwards & Hulme eds., 1994) (survey-
ing approaches taken by NGOs to increase their impact in development efforts); Peter Evans, Development 
Strategies Across the Public-Private Divide, 24 World Dev. 1033 (1996) (arguing that shared development 
projects between state and civil society can promote development); Peter Uvin, Pankaj S. Jain & L. David 
Brown, Think Large and Act Small: Toward a New Paradigm for NGO Scaling Up, 28 World Dev. 1409 
(2000) (on the spill-over and scaling-up effects of NGOs and collaboration with government). 
56. Id. at 5. 
57. Id. 
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who act and think in a “development lawyering”58 perspective, i.e., “less like 
lawyers and more like agents of social change.”59 
The legal empowerment paradigm can be closely related to the above-
mentioned U.S.-inspired community action or collaborative poverty lawyer-
ing concepts. As such, it becomes subject to criticism and resistance by a large 
constituency within ROLA: vested legal elites and conservative groups 
within MDBs. To anticipate such criticism, Golub grounds his conceptual 
proposal in empirical research that shows legal empowerment’s impact on 
poverty alleviation, good governance, and other development goals. 60 
Indeed, Golub’s normative and empirical framework is one example of a 
critical pragmatic approach to ROLA. It shows the persuasive impact of se-
rious empirical research on any argument for the inclusion and funding of 
inclusive and pro-poor programs in ROLA. Further qualitative and quantita-
tive impact evaluation research should be undertaken for pro-poor programs 
supporting similar activities such as SER lawyering, which, when operated 
by responsible civil society organizations in creative and pragmatic ways, 
have the potential to contribute positively to the daily lives of poor people in 
developing countries.61 As Beyond Common Knowledge suggests, this research 
should provide empirical and political-economy-informed data, which, if con-
clusive, could convince development agencies and ROLA constituencies to 
include such programs in the major ªnancial ºows of ROLA more regularly. 
Although there are few impact evaluations that have been carried out so 
far,62 they lack sophistication and would beneªt from “reªnement.”63 The in-
volvement of the World Bank in this ªeld is a signal that MDBs are paying 
closer attention to access-to-justice and legal empowerment programs.64 
 
                                                                                                                      
58. Id. at 38. 
59. Id. at 3. 
60. Id. at 41. 
61. As Golub notes:  
[I]t is ironic, in fact, that some organizations that fund extensive research on legal systems or human 
rights conduct virtually none on the impact of their own law-oriented programs. It can be far more 
rewarding to report anecdotal progress to the higher levels of an institutional hierarchy than it is to 
undertake the kinds of in-depth quantitative and qualitative inquiries that might contribute to 
learning and impact but might also yield negative results. Until such research is valued as contrib-
uting to progress even if it reveals problems, law-oriented work will lag behind other development 
ªelds in terms of both sophistication and impact.  
Golub, supra note 4, at 33. 
62. See, e.g., Many Roads to Justice (Mary McClymont & Stephen Golub eds., 2000) (case study 
and multicountry empirical documentation/advocative piece); Golub & MacQuay, supra note 52 (multi-
country impact evaluation/advocacy piece for the Asian Development Bank). Bruce Owen & Jorge Portillo, 
Legal Reform, Externalities and Economic Development: Measuring the Impact of Legal Aid on Poor Women 
in Ecuador, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research Paper No. 02-032, 2003 (evaluation for the 
World Bank of Ecuador legal aid program from a law and economics perspective). 
63. Golub, supra note 4, at 33. 
64. Similarly indicative of this trend is the Workshop on Legal Services for the Poor, held on Apr. 4–
5, 2003 at the World Bank by Daniel Manning and Stephen Golub, which gathered lawyers involved in 
socioeconomic lawyering and legal empowerment NGOs. For general information about the workshop, 
see Legal and Judicial Reform, available at http://www4.worldbank.org/legal/leglr/index.html (last vis-
ited Apr. 17, 2006). 
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As these examples attest, poverty lawyers, academics, and activists should 
embrace the critical pragmatic approach, which grounds their more robust 
normative framework in empirical research and political economy analysis. 
It is an approach that acknowledges as progressive the current doctrinal and 
policy shifts in the development ªeld, describes the theoretical ºaws of the 
current doctrine—particularly its distributive biases, and calls for more inclu-
sive, egalitarian values, for more critical understandings of the rights concept, 
and for the inclusion of alternative visions of development at both academic 
and policymaking levels. At the same time, it embraces the political econ-
omy analysis presented in Beyond Common Knowledge to denounce the gaps be-
tween ROLA theory and practice. Such an approach not only provides a pro-
gressive normative framework for ROLA, but also the practical grounding 
to place ROLA advocates in the best position to advocate for, or “sell,” the 
inclusion of more robust, experimental, inclusive and people-based pro-poor 
programs in the ROLA. 
III. Conclusion 
Overall, Beyond Common Knowledge carries an impressive load of timely and 
counterintuitive empirical data, ideas, and insights that make an important 
contribution to ROLA thinking, and should allow for a renewed research 
agenda on its practice, notwithstanding the fact that a discussion of Africa is 
sadly absent from this volume. 
In re-evaluating the sacred concept of judicial independence, proposing an 
empirical critique of both formal judicial centrism and the “romantic illu-
sion” of informal justice,65 and questioning the very relevance of ROLA pro-
grams to development generally, this volume makes a valuable contribution 
to law and development discourse. By highlighting the gap between articu-
lated goals—such as poverty reduction—and the actual practice of ROLA, 
Beyond Common Knowledge represents an important and much-needed wake-
up call for ROLA practitioners and law and development thinkers generally. 
I have argued for using the empirical insights espoused in Beyond Common 
Knowledge to articulate a more robust normative framework that includes 
pro-poor programs in ROLA. I call this the critical pragmatic approach to 
ROLA. The current critique and unªnished reformulation of the Washing-
ton Consensus offers a unique opportunity to place social change, emancipa-
tion, and poverty concerns at the center of ROLA rhetoric and practice. In-
 
                                                                                                                      
65. Marc Galanter & Jayanth K. Krishnan, Debased Informalism: Lok Adalats and the Legal Rights in 
Modern India, in Beyond Common Knowledge, supra note 1, at 96, 120 (empirically criticizing the lok 
adalats [people’s courts, promoted by the Indian government as “traditional” local dispute resolution 
mechanisms to ensure broader access to justice in India] as an imperfect substitute solution to reforming 
formal courts). In their chapter, Galanter and Krishnan warn that informal dispute resolution is not a 
panacea. Lok adalats, they argue, can be highly deªcient (e.g., in the hearing process) and can divert 
much-needed energy from formal judicial mechanims. Without the shadow of law, lok adalats become an 
example of “debased informalism.” The authors argue it is a “romantic illusion” to believe that informal 
justice can replace—rather than complete—a functioning formal legal system. Id. 
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deed, the political economy of donor agencies and MDBs is a complex com-
bination of interests, ideologies, and theoretical debates. Advocacy for programs 
that could both be accepted by ROLA constituencies and actually help poor 
and marginalized people in their daily lives should therefore take place prag-
matically and at all levels, including in conceptual and political arenas. Such 
advocacy should be considered as a complement to—and as a foundation for—
further empirical approaches to ROLA targeted at pro-poor social and eco-
nomic rights and legal empowerment programs. 
Such programs, when operated by creative and community-based civil society 
organizations, can have a positive effect on the daily lives and transformative 
horizons of poor people. However, impact and qualitative evaluation research on 
these programs is currently insufªciently developed. Such research is crucial 
to reºect critically on such programs and to convince both development agen-
cies and ROLA constituencies to channel resources toward programs that are 
proven to beneªt people “on the ground,” or to redirect resources toward more 
effective means within, or beyond, ROLA. 
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